De Animus

[Anonymous]

#728

When Gendlin referred to a “rational person” early in the new piece, that sent me off googling, until I landed in Book 3 of Aristotle’s De Animus (On The Soul).

https://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/soul.3.iii.html

Gendlin says: “There are ancient sophisticated conceptual strategies to think about how human beings live in reality in such a way that we can know something.” Although he cites only much more recent sources, he and Aristotle seem to me to be in conversation, as both speak to how our larger life force, living movement, senses and perceptions feed into our rational thinking (and irrational thinking) in different ways. Aristotle and Gendlin both move from a broader sense of what animates us, to how we can use all that to think and make logical connections. For example:

Aritotle (Book III Chap IV): “Once the mind has become each set of its possible objects, as a man of science has, when this phrase is used of one who is actually a man of science (this happens when he is now able to exercise the power on his own initiative), its condition is still one of potentiality, but in a different sense from the potentiality which preceded the acquisition of knowledge by learning or discovery: the mind too is then able to think itself.”

Gendlin: “Our students were not used to the process we call “FOCUSING,” spending time with an observation or impression which is directly and physically sensed, but unclear. All educated people “know” such things in their field of study. Sometimes such a thing can feel deeply important, but typically people assume that it “makes no sense” and cannot be said or thought into.”

Here’s some more Aristotle:

“There are two distinctive peculiarities by reference to which we characterize the soul (1) local movement and (2) thinking, discriminating, and perceiving. Thinking both speculative and practical is regarded as akin to a form of perceiving; for in the one as well as the other the soul discriminates and is cognizant of something which is….

“That perceiving and practical thinking are not identical is therefore obvious; for the former is universal in the animal world, the latter is found in only a small division of it. Further, speculative thinking is also distinct from perceiving-I mean that in which we find rightness and wrongness-rightness in prudence, knowledge, true opinion, wrongness in their opposites; for perception of the special objects of sense is always free from error, and is found in all animals, while it is possible to think falsely as well as truly, and thought is found only where there is discourse of reason as well as sensibility. For imagination is different from either perceiving or discursive thinking, though it is not found without sensation, or judgement without it….

“Thinking is different from perceiving and is held to be in part imagination, in part judgement:….

“As sight is the most highly developed sense, the name Phantasia (imagination) has been formed from Phaos (light) because it is not possible to see without light.

And because imaginations remain in the organs of sense and resemble sensations, animals in their actions are largely guided by them, some (i.e. the brutes) because of the non-existence in them of mind, others (i.e. men) because of the temporary eclipse in them of mind by feeling or disease or sleep.”

[Sondra Perl]

#735

Wow, Sean. Thank you for this brief tour of Aristotle’s resonances with Gene. I know Gene ‘knows’ western philosophy and has been a life-long reader and teacher of the philosophic tradition (from Aristotle to Heidegger and then some), but I would have to pause and linger here for a long time before I could address any of this myself. All fascinating, especially your google trail and where it has led you.

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